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THE INFLUENCE OF MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO 
ON MODERN LEGAL AND POLITICAL IDEAS 
Marcus Tullius Cicero is the father of modern Iaw and politics(l). 
Cicero's influence was significant in the centuries following his death (2), 
throughout the middle ages(3), and during the renaissance of European 
culture ( 4 ), but never so much n or so directly as in the emergence of 
modernity and in the development of modem law and constitutional 
government (5). Emergent modernity differed from earlier (and subsequent) 
periods of European history in the depth of its fidelity to Cicero. The early 
modems became the most faithful apostles of Cicero's thought and ideals 
because their world and politica! circumstances were in many ways closer 
to those of Cicero than those of any intervening centuries. The influence 
of Cicero's legai and politica! ideas on the modern world illustrates the 
deci sive importance that the study of history can have on legai innovation 
and social change(6). The modern world would not have developed where 
(!) For a collection of essays on Cicero's influence on modero law, see Richard 
O. Brooks (ed.), Cicero and Modem Law, to be published in 2009. For a broader study of 
Cicero's in fluence through the ages, see Thaddaus Zielinski, Cicero im Wandel der 
Jahrlumderte, Leipzig-Berlin 1929'. See al so Richard Tuck, The 'modem' theory of natura! 
law, in A . Pagden (ed.), The Languages of Politica/ The01y in Early-Modem Europe, 
Cambridge 1987, 99-119. 
(2) Even Augustus is said to have conceded that Cicero was a great orator and a great 
patriot (Piutarch, Cicero, 49) See Pau! MacKendrick, The Phi/osophical Books of Cicero, 
New York 1989, 258 ff. for Cicero's posthumous reputation. 
(3) Far a recent collection on this topic, see Yirginia Cox - John O. Ward, The Rhetoric 
of Cicero in its Medieval and Early Renaissance Comment01y Traditi011. , Leiden 2006, and 
also other chapters in this present volume of <<Ciceroniana>>. 
(4) See Hans Baron, The Crisis of the Early ltali011 Renaissance: Civic Humanism and 
Republican Liberry in an Age of Classicism and Tyranny, revised ed. Princeton 1993. Cf. 
Remigio Sabbadini, Storia del Ciceronianismo e di altre questioni lellerarie nell'età della 
Rinascenza, Torino 1885. 
(5) See M. N. S. Sellers, The Sacred Fire of Liberty: Republicanism, Liberalism and 
the Law, Basingstoke 1998. Cf. Charles Howard Mcilwain, Co11stitllliona/i.mt Ancient and 
Modem , revised ed. Ithaca 1947 ; Martin van Gelderen - Quentin Skinner (eds.), 
Republicanism and Constitutionalism i11 Early Modem Europe: A Shared Europea/l 
Heritage, Cambridge 2005. 
(6) See M. N. S. Sellers, Republican Lega/ The01y : The Hist01y, Constitlllion and 
Purposes of Law in a Free State, Basingstoke 2003, 102 ff. 
246 MORTIMER N. S. SELLERS 
it did, when it did, nor as it did were it not far the life and the writings of 
Marcus Tullius Cicero(7). 
l. Ancients and Moderns 
Modernity requires definition, and has developed slightly different 
connotations in the many different fields which it has touched(8), but the 
centrai and most important distinction between the 'modern ' sensibility 
and other ways of thinking has been the modem appeal to reason against 
arbitrary authority (9) . This attitude was also the distinguishing 
characteristic of Cicero as a philosopher and as a lawyer(lO). Cicero 
identified the law with recta ratio ('right reason' )(ll) and justified ali 
legai and politica! authority in terms of its service to the res publica or 
common good of the people (l2). Searching for the common good in this 
way is not uniquely modern (13). Plato (l4) and Aristotle (l5), had used 
similar vocabu lary , and even Saint Augustine could accept and 
Christianize many of Cicero' s definitions (16), mak:ing them farniliar 
throughout the rniddle ages(17). Cicero' s views were well known and 
respected for centuries, but they were also extremely corrosive to the 
(7) Carlyle drew the line between the ancient and the modern at Cicero: Robert 
W. Carlyle- Alexander J. Carlyle, A History of Mediaeval Politica/ The01y in the West, l, 
London 1903, l f. Cf. Robert Denoon Cumming, Hwnan Nature and Hist01y, Chicago 1969. 
(8) See e. g. Stephen E. Toulmin, Cosmopo/is: The Hidden Agenda of Modernity, 
Chicago 1990; Jiirgen Habermas, Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures 
trans. Frederick G. Lawrence, Cambridge, Mass. 1985 ; Jonathan l. Israel , Enlightemnent 
Contested: Philosophy, Modemity, and the Emancipati011 of Man , 1670-1752, Oxford 2006. 
(9) Immanuel Kant, BeanMortung der Frage: Was ist Aujkliirung ? (1784) in Was ist 
Aujkliinmg: Ausgewiih/te Kleine Schriften, ed. E. Cassirer - H. D. Brandt, Hamburg 1999. 
(10) See particularly M. Tullius Cicero, Academica, De legibus, De republica, De 
natura deorum, and De officiis. See also (among many others) J. G. F. Powelt (ed.), Cicero 
the Philosopher, Oxford 1995; Neal Wood, Cicero's Social and Politica/ Thought, Berkeley 
1988; and Pau! MacKendrick, The Philosophica/ Books of Cicero, New York 1989. 
(Il) Cic. leg. 1, 18. Cf. Phil. 2, 28. 
(12) See e. g. Cic. rep. l, 39. 
(13) See e. g. Michael A. Smith, Human Dignity and the Common Good in the 
Aristotelian-Thomistic Tradition, Lewiston, New York 1995. 
(14) Plat. polit. t, 342e; nom. 4, 715b. 
(15) Aristot. polit. 3, 4, 7. 
(16) Aug. civ. 2, 21. Cf. Cic. rep. 2, 42. 
(17) See e. g. Hans Baron, Cicero and the Roman Civic Spiri/ in the Middle Ages cmd 
Early Renaissance, << Bulletin of the John Rylands Library>> 22, 1938,72-97, revised in Id. , /n 
Search of Florelltine Civic Hwnanism: Essays on the Transirion from Medieva/ ro Modem 
Politica/ Thought, Princeton 1988 ; John E. Sandys, A Histmy of Classica/ Scholarship from 
the Sixth Century B. C. to the End of the Middle Ages, Cambridge 1903. 
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Jegitimacy of unchecked power. What modem lawyers most appreciated in 
Cicero was his commitment to reason, his contempt for regnum, his 
Jifelong batti e against arbitrary authority, and his desire to ad v ance and 
protect the public welfare through constitutional reform(18). 
'Ancient' an d 'modern' began as temporal terms, so that whatever is 
most recent is 'modern' in one sense, and will become 'ancient' with the 
passage of time (l9). To speak of 'modernity' in a more timeless way, 
however, is to identify one of the great turning points of history. At 
various times in various disciplines and to differing degrees between the 
twelfth and e ighteenth centuries (and to some extent before and 
afterwards) people began to order their lives, beliefs, laws, and politics by 
considering reason and the public good, rather than the dictates of religion, 
authority, power, or naked self-interest(20). Simply reciting this difference 
makes clear the extent to which premodern attitudes are stili very much 
present and perhaps growing in strength in the ' postmodern' era (21). 
Separating 'modernity ' from its purely temporal definition makes it easier 
to understand the extent to which the emergence of a 'modern' sensibility 
required the revival of 'ancient' ideals(22). 
'Ancient' and 'modern ' conceptions of law and government have 
much more in conunon with each other than either does with thought in 
the centuries that separate them. The Fiorentine Donato Giannotti 
repeated a commonly made distinction, when he moumed the destruction 
of ancien t conceptions of law and government, which sought the 
common good, at the hands of Caesar and his successors, who pursued 
their own private interests(23) . James Harrington at the time of the 
English Cornmonwealth (24) and John Adarns, during the American 
Revolution (25), repeated an d endorsed Giannotti ' s famous observation 
(18) See e. g. John Adams, A De_fence of t h e Constitutions of Govemment of the Uni t ed 
States of America, I, London 1787, XVI- XJX. 
(19) The term 'modernus' seems first to have emerged in the fourth century to 
distinguish the new sensibility of the Christian era. Matei Calinescu, Five Faces of 
Modemity, Charlotte, North Carolina 1987', 14 and 41. 
(20) See Martin van Gelderen - Quentin Skinner (eds.), Repub/icanism: A Shared 
European Heritage, Cambridge 2002. 
(2 1) The postmodern turn towards superstition, self-assertion and violence is often 
marked by a recrudescence of citations to Friedrich Nietzsche. 
(22) Cf. Thomas Chaimowicz, Antiquity as Modernity : Freedom and Bala11.ce in the 
Tlwught of Montesquieu and Burke, Edison, NJ 2008. First published as Freiheit und 
Gleichgewicht im Denken Montesquieus und Burkes, Wien 1985. 
(23) Donato Gian notti, Libro della repubblica de' Viniziani (1540) in Opere l . p. 15. Cf. 
Tac. ann. l, 1-2. 
(24) James Harrington, The Commonwealth of Oceano (1656) ed. J. G. A. Pocock, 
Cambridge 1992, 8 f. 
(25) John Adams, Defence ci t. , I. 126. 
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and joined him in seeking to revive what they called government 'de 
jure' or «the empire of laws and not of men»(26). The 'great question', 
as modern students of politics understood it, was «what combination of 
powers in society, or what form of government, will compel the 
formation of good and equa! laws, an impartial execution, and faithful 
interpretation of them, so that citizens may constantly enjoy the benefit 
of them, and be sure of their conti nuance» (27). 
Leaping directly into the eighteenth century Enlightenment, in the 
person of John Adams, may seem somewhat premature in a discussion of 
modernity, which h ad its beginnings ce n turi es earlier. The jump is justified 
because the French and American Revolutions were the most decisive 
moments in the triumph of modern law, and its conquest of European 
institutions (28). John Adams, the author of Thoughts o n Government 
(1776), of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts (1780) 
and of the Defence of the Constitutions of Governmenl of United Sta t es of 
America (1787-1788), reflected and institutionalized modern conceptions of 
law and government constructed solely (as he be lieved) «by use of reason 
and the senses» (29). When Adams set out to list the reading and the 
reasoning that produced the modern laws an d constitutions of his era (30), 
he began with Cicero: «As ali the ages of the world have not produced a 
greater statesmen and philosopher united in the same character, his 
authority should have great weight» (31). Modernity arose from imitation of 
the ancients, who seemed at first almost divine in their accomplishments, 
but true modernity (in any field) develops only when moderns begin finally 
to surpass the ancients in applying their reason to the world around them, 
and cease to depend so much on the ancient predecessors who inspired their 
fiTSt (and many subsequent) steps towards enlightenment. 
2. Cicero on Law and Government 
Cicero defined the law as 'right reason ' (recta ratio) discerning what 
ought to be done, and forbidding what is harmful (32). He sought the 
(26) lbid. 
(27) lbid. l. 128. 
(28) See R. R. Palmer, The Age o.f Democratic Revolution: A Politica/ Histoty oj 
Europe and America, 1760-1800, Princeton 1959. 
(29) Adams, Dejence cit., l. Xlii-XIV. 
(30) lbid. l. xv. 
(3 1) Jbid. J. XVII. 
(32) Cic. leg. l , 18: /ex est ratio SLI/111110 insita in natura, quae iubet ea, quae jacienda 
swll, prohibetque contraria. Eadem ratio cwn est in hominis mente confirmata et cot({ecta, 
lex est. itaque arbitrantur prudentiam esse legem, cuius ea vissi t, ut recte facere iubeat, ve t et 
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sources of law and justice in nature(33) and in the natura! fellowship of 
humanity (34 ), discovered in detail tlu-ough the application of reason, 
which should govern (and precedes) ali positive enactments of the 
state(35). This is in itself a revolutionary doctrine, measuring positive law 
against the standard of justice, but Cicero went further, by trying to 
discover the institutional arrangements that would best secure and 
perpetuate justice for the people, through the structures of constitutional 
government(36) . Cicero's six books on the republic were lost, for the most 
part, unti! the nineteenth century, but fragments enough remained to reveal 
how he had struggled to perfect the actual constitution of Rome, with 
artful checks and balances between the powers and magistrates of the 
state(37). 
Cicero considered any true ' republic' (res publica) to be the property 
of the people (res populi), when the people band together to pursue 
shared justice and their common good (38). States exist to realize in fact 
the truths that philosophers try to capture in words(39). This could be 
attempted through various forms of government, but Cicero suggested 
that the most effective would be ' mixed' (moderatus et permixtus), 
combining an d balancing the bes t aspects of various public institutions ( 40). 
'Liberty ' (libertas), for example, (qua quidem nihil potest esse dulcius) 
thrives best in a state where the people have ultimate power(41), and all 
citizens have equal legai ri ghts(42), and the vote(43), but some decisions 
wi ll stili need to be made by experts, or by the expeditious action of a 
single authority(44). This balanced constitution (constitutio) will be more 
just, Cicero sugges ted, but also more stable than other forms of 
government (45). 
delinquere. Cf. Phil. 2, 28: est enim lex nihil aliud nisi ree/a el a nwnine deorum tracta ratio 
imperans honesta, prohibens contraria. 
(33) Ci c. le g. l, 17. 
(34) lbid. I , 16. 
(35) lbid. l , 19. 
(36) lbid I, 20. 
(37) For the influence of these fragments of Cicero' s De republica, see Jolm Adams, 
Defence cit., I. xvu-x1x. 
(38) Cic. rep. l, 39: res publica res populi, populus autem non omnis hominum coetus 
quoquo modo congregatus, sed coetus multitudinis iuris consensu et utilitatis COIIIIIILIIlione 
sociatus. 
(39) lbid. I, 2. 
(40) lbid. l, 45. Cf. l, 69. 
(41 ) lbid. I , 47. 
(42) lbid. I, 49. 
(43) lbid. I, 51. 
(44) lbid. I, 55. 
(45) lbid. I, 69. Cf. ibid. 2, 41: statu esse optimo constitutam rem publicam, quae ex 
tribus generibus illis, regali el optumati et populari, confuse modice ... 
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Cicero further endorsed certain very specific institutions, such as a 
congress (comitia) of the people and a ' senate ' of leading men(46), whose 
joint approvai would be required to confirm the laws(47). These and other 
key elements of his ideai constitution maintained the careful balance of 
rights, duties, an d magistrates necessary t o preserve the ' republic' 
intact(48). Cicero compared the well-balanced constitution to harmony in 
music and sought to establish justice through the measured reason of good 
institutions, similar to those which had developed aver many generations 
in Rome (49). Far Cicero the study of law and the institutions of justice 
was the highest form of science(50), since law and justice concern ali 
peoples and derive from nature, which is accessible to anyone wise 
enough to contemplate and pursue the ttuth (51). 
Taken to its logica! conclusion, Cicero's theory of just laws and 
republican government condernned any unbalanced state as a 'tyranny' 
and worthy of revolution (52), whether i t was dominated by a monarch, or 
some faction (53) or even by the people themselves(54). If a good life is 
only possible under balanced constitutional government (55), then all 
governments should become republics(56), in deference to uni versal 
truth(57), and nothing would be more foolish than to confuse the positive 
laws of a bad government with binding law or justice (58). Cicero asserted 
a universal right to justice, received by all human beings directly from 
( 46) lbid. 3, 27 f. 
(47) Jbid 2, 56. 
(48) On the importance of the magistrates, see ibid. 3, 12. 
(49) lbid 2, 57. Cf. 2, 69: t11 enim in fidibus aut tibiis atque ut in ca/llu ipso ac vocibus 
concentus est quidam tenendus ex distinctis sonis, quem in mutatwn aut discrepalllem aures 
eruditae ferre non possunt, isque concelllus ex dissimillimantm vocwn moderatione concors 
tamen efficitur et congruens, sic ex summis et infimis et mediis interiectis ordinibus ut sonis 
moderata ratione civitas consensu dissimillorwn concinit; et quae lzarmonia a musicis 
dicitur in camu, ea est in civitate concordia, artissimum atque optilnu111 o111ni in re publica 
vinculum incolumitatis, eaque sine iustitia nullo poeto esse potest. 
(50) lbid. 3, 4 f. 
(5 1) lbid. 3, 33: Est quidem vera /ex ratio naturae congruens, diffusa in omnes, 
constans, sempitem a, quae vocet ad officium iubendo, velando a fi·aude deterreat. Cicero 
goes on to explain that the foundations of la w in human nature are val i d forali nations and ali 
times, and cannot be repealed, even by positive enactment. Cf. l, 42. 
(52) lbid. 3, 43. 
(53) lbid. 3, 44. 
(54) lbid. 3, 45. 
(55) /bi d. 5, 7. 
(56) Cf. ibid. 6, 13. 
(57) Cic. leg. l , 14 f. Cf. ibid l, 23. 
(58) lbid. l, 42. 
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nature, rather than by any positive enactment(59). Reason gives us ali the 
ability to think, discuss, argue about, and discover the truth about justice, 
as about ali other subjects of our senses an d natura! perceptions (60). Ali 
people in all nations everywhere have this capacity to reason, which 
Cicero calls the particular 'virtue' of humanity(61 ). 
lf Cicero's attitudes towards constitutional govemment, justice, and 
the laws would be particularly important to modernity, bis writings on 
duties have had a striking influence in every era since they were written, 
almost to the present day. Private duties of justice and honesty are 
applicable un der tyrannies and theocracy, as much as they are in republi.cs, 
and therefore less threatening to the status quo. Yet Cicero's famous 
volume De officiis shares the fundamental assumptions of his other 
writings, an d may ha ve had a greater influence, even o n modernity, 
because of its wider circulation. Here too Cicero stressed the search for 
truth as fundamental to every human endeavor (62), and found the truth in 
laws derived from nature, for the generai good, which people bave a 
natura! duty to obey(63). Thus duty, like law, arises from nature, and the 
needs of human society(64), and virtue consists in seeking out and 
perforrning what truth, justice and reason require (65) of us, as participants 
in the universal society of mankind (66). 
3. Pre-modern Attitudes Towards Cicero 
C icero' s authori ty much preceded modernity, which makes it 
important to distinguish the 'modern' interest in Cicero from that of his 
earlier admirers. European recourse to Cicero became 'modern' when 
Europeans turned from irnitating Cicero's rhetoric and style to considering 
his views on religion, la w and politics (67). Where Europeans once 
accepted Tacitus' view that the checks and balances of republican law and 
(59) lbid. l, 28: nihil esr profecro praesrabilius qua111 piane inlellegi nos ad iusliliam 
esse nalos, neque opinione, sed natura co11stitutu111 esse ius. 
(60) lbid. l, 30. 
(61) lbid.: nec est quisquam genti.\· ullius, qui ducem nactus ad virtutem pervenire non 
possit. Cf. l, 33: quibus enim rari o natura data est, isdem etimn recta ratio data est, ergo et 
/ex, quae ex ree/a rario in iubendo et velando; si !ex, ius quoque; et o111nibus ratio; ius igitur 
datwn est omnibus. Cf. also l , 45 : esT eni111 virtus petfecta ratio, quod certe in natura est. 
(62) Cic. aff. l, 13: in pri111isque hominis est propria veri inquisitio atque investigatio. 
(63) lbid.: utiliratis causa iuste et legitinze imperandi. 
(64) lbid. l , 15. 
(65) !bid. l, 17. Cf. 3, 72. 
(66) Cic. aff. 3, 69. Cf. leg. l , 23. 
(67) On Cicero's influence in European rhetoric, see Tho mas M. Conley, Rhetoric in 
the European. Tradition. , Chicago 1994, 34 ff. 
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government, while desirable, are fleeting and almost impossible to 
maintain (68), they later carne gradually to share Cicero's optimism that 
reason (ratio) could find the right measure of checks and balances in 
government to achieve justice (iustitia) and harmony (harmonia) in public 
life(69). John Adams made explicit reference to both authors (and to the 
passages cited above) when he asserted his nation's renewed commitment 
to reason, to politica! science, and to a judicious balance of public 
powers (70), as capable of securing «the public interest, which is common 
right and justice» (71). 
The full text of Cicero' s dialogue on the republic was lost to modern 
authors, so it is striking how often they quote his most famous passages. 
Most of the excerpts from Cicero repeated by John Adams were fragments 
salvaged from the works of Saint Augustine (72), who wrote hi s 
immensely influential treatise 011 the City of God largely to cou11ter 
contemporary pagani, who blamed Christianity for the weakness, decline, 
and ultimate sack of Rome (73). Augustine replied that wordly affairs had 
bee11 a lost cause from the start (74). This led him into an elaborate 
digression 011 Cicero, who had see11 Rome's republic fail four centuries 
before the calarnities that troubled Augusti11e 's co11temporaries (and well 
before the birth of Christ) (75). 
Christian fatalism (as regards the terrestrial world), and deferential 
quieti sm (as regards politica! authority)(76) led Augustine to disparage 
Cicero's view that any earthly power can ever aspire to justice. Where 
Cicero had embraced politica! checks and balances, as practical requisites 
for justice and state (77), Augustine insisted that true justice will never be 
possible on an earth in which humanity will always be inescapably 
polluted by sin (78). If Caesar's usurpation imposed servitude on Rome, as 
Ci cero, Sallust, an d many others i nsisted (an d Augusti ne repeated) (79), 
then sinful humans would need to embrace a similar servitude to God, to 
raise themselves from their fa lle11 condition. Augustine denied that human 
(68) Tac. 01111. 4, 33. 
(69) Cic. rep. 2, 42. 
(70) Adams. Defence cit., l. 1-11 and XVI-XVIII, also citing Cicero, rep. 2, 23. 
(71) Adams, Defence cit., l. 127. 
(72) See particularly his Defence cit., in the preface. 
(73) Aug. civ. l , l f. 
(74) lbid. 13, 13-17. 
(75) lbid. 2, 2!. 
(76) Cf. Matth. 22, 2!. 
(77) E. g. Cic. rep. 2, 69. 
(78) Aug. civ. !9 , !5. 
(79) See Aug. civ. 2, !8 f. quoting a fragment from Sallust' s Histories ( l, li ). 
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reason could ever contro) human vices(80), and identified faith, not 
reason, as the only source of tme justice. The pre-Christian Roman 
republic, and the infidels (such as Cicero), who inhabited it, deserved (he 
suggested) their ultimate fate of complete an d utter destmction (8 L). 
Augustine's preference for faith and authority over reason and 
deliberation became the guiding principle of European thought in the 
centuries between the faJJ of Rome and the emergence of modernity. 
Cicero, as the single greatest Roman authority on legai and politica! ideas, 
required detailed refutation, to make this new dispensation possible. Thus 
the careful arguments made against Cicero by Christian apologists had the 
paradoxical effect of preserving some of his most important ideas for 
posterity. Augustine immortalized Cicero's definition of a res publica as 
res populi (82), in which the people share a sense of justice an d 
comnùtment to the common good of society as a whole(83). Augustine 
did so in order to demonstrate that there can be no republic without the 
dominion of God (84). He wanted to subordinate reason to God, but in so 
doing Saint Augustine preserved Cicero's encomium on reason, where 
future generations could find it. 
4. Cicero the Revolutionary 
When Patrick Henry stood before the Virginia Convention in March, 
1775, to assert the rights of Americans against their king, he said that there 
was just one light by which his feet would be guided, «the lamp of 
experience». Henry knew, he said, «no way of j udging the future but by 
the past»(85) and an essential part of Virginia's past, for Hemy as for his 
audience, was their own childhood reading of C icero's orations, and 
particularly of his orations against Catiline and the Philippics (86). So 
(80) Aug. civ. 19, 21. 
(81) Citing Exodus 22, 20. 
(82) Aug. civ. 19, 21. 
(83) Cic. rep. 1, 39: res publica res popu/i, popu/us autem non omnis hominum coetus 
quoquo modo congregatus, sed coetus multitttdinis iuris consensrr et utilitatis commwrione 
sociatus. 
(84) Aug. civ. 19, 21. 
(85) Patrick Henry, in the Second Virginia Convention, Richmond, March 23, 1775. 
(86) On the importance of Cicero in the American Colonia! curriculum, see Reinho1d 
Meyer, Classica Americana: The Creek and Romwr Heritage in the United States, Detroit 
1984, and Id., The Classic Pages: Classica/ Readings of Eighteenth-Century Americans, 
University Park, Pennsylvania 1975. Cf. Richard M. Gummere, The America/l Colonia/ Mind 
and the Classica/ Tradition , Cambridge, Mass. 1963, 55 ff. 
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Henry concluded bis own Philippic against George III with words that 
recalled the Cicero's defiance of Antony: «Give me liberty or give me 
death » (87). The analogy was not a new one: «Caesar had bis Brutus», 
Henry had threatened ten years earlier, «Charles had his Cromwell ... and 
George the third may profit by their examples» (88). Henry sa w his own 
fight for liberty as part of a centuries-old tradition of resistance to tyranny, 
that began with Cicero and Rome(89). 
Many of the leaders of the revolutions that turned the world towards 
reason and modernity in politics were lawyers like Patrick Henry, who 
took Cicero as their personal model. Johan van Oldenbarnevelt and Hugo 
Grotius in the Netherlands, John Hampden and John Pym in England, 
John Adams and Tbomas Jefferson in the United States, Cami lle 
Desmoulins and Pierre Vergniaud in France, were all lawyers wbo risked 
their lives to challenge arbitrary authority (or perceived themselves to be 
doing so), as Cicero had risked his !ife against Julius Caesar and Marcus 
Antonius in Rome. Desmoulins explained in his 'Secret History' of the 
Revolution, how the French first learned to lave liberty and hate despotism 
by reading Cicero at school. «They brought us up in the schools of Rome 
and Athens», he complained, «to live under Claudius and Vitellius». 
Admiring the Roman past, young men had courage to hope for change in 
the present- and to risk their lives to achieve it (90). 
Henry's posturing and Desmoulins' recollections confirm how 
important Cicero's direct influence could be on lawyers and other 
educated persons . Cicero (like Aristotle, Sallust and to some extent 
Tacitus) had been present in the schools and universities for centuries, and 
therefore moderated by subsequent interpretation, but each generation also 
had direct access to ancient authors, and could learn from their writings 
without mediation. This became increasingly true with each passing 
century, as more works of Cicero and his contemporaries were discovered, 
more were translated, and as the printing press and growing prosperity 
increased the numbers of Europeans with access to ancient Iearning. Many 
stili believed, with Tacitus, that linùted government under a balanced 
constitution, while adnùrable, was unrealistic, and almost impossible to 
maintain (91). Cicero's orations held out a more hopeful mode!, that 
(87) Patrick Henry, in the Second Virginia Convention, Richmond, March 23, 1775. Cf. 
Cic. Phil. 8, 29: alli libertas parata victori est alli mors proposi/a vieto. 
(88) Patrick Henry, in the Virginia House of Burgesses, May 29, 1765, in the debate 
about the Stamp Act Resolutions. 
(89) See William Wirt, The Life and Clwracter of Patrick Henry, Philadelphia 1836, 54. 
(90) Camille Desmoulins, Histoire des Brissotins ou Fragment de l'histoire secrète de 
la révolwion et des six premiers mais de la République, Paris 1793. 
(9 1) Tac. 01111. 4, 33 : Nam cttiiCtas nationes et w·bes populus alli primores aut singuli 
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arbitrary authority could be checked and controlled by eloquence, reason, 
and constitutional design, encouraging the vigilance and natura] Iove of 
Jiberty of a unùed people(92). 
Cicero died a horrible death , his hands and head cut off and nailed to 
tbe rostrum by the servants of Octavian and Marcus Antonius, as Plutarch 
recounted the story, to punish him for his Philippics(93). Many of 
Cicero's successors and imitators would suffer or even embrace a similar 
fate. Madame Roland, who, as the young Manon Phlipon smuggled ber 
copy of Plutarch into church instead of a prayer-book(94), was executed 
by decapitation. So were Camille Desmoulins, Pierre Vergniaud, and many 
others w ho opposed tbe tyranny of Robespierre (95) Vergniaud wrote witb 
bis blood on the walls of bis prison: «Potius mori quam foedari». Like 
Henry, he preferred an honest death to life under despotism(96). Algemon 
Sidney was also decapitated for bis writings, which began by invoking 
Cicero(97), as also was Henry Vane, who «sealed» bis service to the 
commonwealth «with blood» (98). «A better senator», John Milton wrote, 
«ne'er held the helm of Rome» (99). Even careful Oldenbamevelt was 
beheaded in the end, for the threat his p1inciples posed to arbitrary 
authority (100). 
Not ali those w ho di ed for the «o id cause » (101) of la w, reason, and 
constitutional govemment(l02) deliberately chose to share the fate of 
Ci cero, but ali knew the dangers of provoking arbitrary authority, an d 
persevered regardless. Cicero of the Philippics and orations against 
Catiline was just as important for the development of European law and 
regunt: delecta ex iis et consociata rei publicae fomw /audari facilius quam evenire ve[ si 
evenit, lwud diuturna esse potest. 
(92) Cic. Cari/. 4, 15 f. Cf. 2, 25. 
(93) Plut. Cic. 48, 4 - 49, l. 
(94) Marie-Jem1ne Roland de la Platière, Mémoires, Paris 1820. 
(95) Jean-Baptiste Louvet de Couvrai delivered a famous speech againsl Robespierre at 
the Convention Nationale (19 October, 1792) denouncing him in the manner of Cicero, as 
being another Catiline. 
(96) Alphonse de Lamartine, Histoire des Girondins, VTI. 47, Paris 1848, 47. 
(97) Algemon Sidney, Discourses Conceming Government, London 1698, lntroduction. 
(98) Sir Henry Vane the younger, last speech, in James K. Hosmer, The Life of Young 
Hew y Vane, Boston 1889, 540. 
(99) John Milton, To Sir Hemy Vane the Younger then adds: << when gowns not arrns 
repelled>>, following Cicero (cedant arma togae). 
(100) The Dutch Revolution against Spain will be slighted to some extent in this 
account, because of its 'premodern' preoccupation with religion. But the Dutch experience 
played an important role in the European turn to ancient models of government. See Jonathan 
lsrael, Radica/ Enlightenment: Philosophy and the Making of Modemity 1650-1750, Oxford 
2001. 
(101) So styled by Algemon Sidney in his speech delivered to the sheriff on the scaffold 
before his execution (December 7"', 1683). 
(102) lbid. 
256 MORTIMER N. S. SELLERS 
government as the Cicero who wrote more measured treatises on laws and 
duties, because the forceful and defiant lawyer gave a mode! not only of 
eloquence but of action(l03). The !ife and speeches of Cicero taught 
European lawyers and politicians not to fear death too much to fight for 
reason, that g lory comes also to those who defend the law, that 
consti tutional government is worth the struggle, and that arms and power 
may ultimately give way to reason and to the just procedures of a well-
constructed legai system. Cedant arma togae remained the rallying cry of 
modern European law(l04). 
The modern appeal to reason and the rule of law against arbitrary 
authority faced two main antagonists in the many centuries between the 
death of Cicero and the politica! advent of modernity . First, claims to 
absolute authority by the emperors (and later k.ings) and second, claims to 
absolute authority by the Popes (and later Protestant divines). Pretensions 
to complete civil and religious contro! became separated to some extent in 
western Europe, and sometirnes carne into conflict, which opened a space 
into which direct appeals to reason, justice and balanced institutions could 
insert themselves. Religious leaders found it useful to support checks and 
balances against politica! power. Magistrates supported checks and 
balances against religious authority. And after the Protestant reformation, 
during the wars of religion, dissenters from the governing faction in every 
state and principality (irrespective of religion) had good reason to resist 
the arbitrary power of their rulers (105). 
S. The Seeds of Modernity 
Marcus Tullius Cicero was an admirer of Aristotle(106) and in 
fundamental agreement with him on many important points of ethics, law, 
and politics (l07). Ari stotle, like Cicero placed great importance on reason, 
the rule of la w (108), a common-good conception of justice (109), and the 
(103) See e. g. Charles-Louis de Secondat, Baron de la Brède et de Montesquieu, 
Discours sur Cicéron (1717), ed. Roger Caillois, Paris 1956. 
(104) Cic. o.ff 1, 77. See for example the reference by Milton, above n. 99. Samuel 
Adams also gave the title Cedmlf arma togae to one of his essays against the British (1776). 
(105) Richard Tuck, Philosophy and Govemment, 1572-1651, Cambridge 1993, contains 
numerous examples of ideas migrating from one side in European politica! and religious 
conflicts to the other, depending on local circumstances. 
(106) See e. g. Cic. Tusc. l, 7; l , 22, e tc. 
(107) See e. g. Cic. ojf 3, 35; leg. 3, 14. 
(108) Aristot. poli/. 3, 6, 13. 
(109) Aristot. polit. 3, 4, 7; 3, 7, l ; 13. 
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study of public institutions (110). This raises the question why Ci cero' s 
influence on modernity was so much greater than that of his models. Partly 
this was because Cicero wrote in graceful Latin, which made him more 
accessible to the Latin West, but the translation and reintroduction of 
many of Aristotle's works into Western European discourse blunted this 
difference and led to a great awakening of leaming, culminating in the 
writings of Tho mas Aquinas and his fo llowers. Aquinas sought to 
reconcile law, reason, and Christian ity, by separating eternai law, natura! 
la w, human la w an d divine la w (111), an d granting that natura! la w is 
accessible to reason (112). This had the effect of preserving divine 
authority and therefore the authority of the Church, while accepting the 
value of reason an d temporal justice in most earthly affairs (113). 
The widespread reception of Aristotle into Christian circles, hi s 
interpretation by Aquinas, and the manipulation of his vocabulary by 
j udicious translation, ha d the salutary effect of strengthening (o n the 
theoretical leve!) the commitment of Clu-istian Europe to laws founded on 
reason for the common good. At the same time, Christian submission to 
constituted authority, both c ivil and ecclesiastica!, muted the practical effect 
of this revival of ancient learning, obscured Aristotle' s commonalities with 
Cicero, and discouraged scholarly attention to the practical questions of 
constitutional architecture that might have been ra ised (far example) by 
Aristotle 's Politics. So great was the assimilation of Aristotle 's work to 
prevailing orthocloxy during this pre-modern period, that the rise of 
humani sm appeared to many as the tr iumph of Ciceronian rhetoricians 
against retrograde Aristotelian scholastics( ll4). This antithesis only finally 
broke down with Leonardo Bruni's new translations of the Ethics and 
Poli ti es into Ciceronian Lati n in the early f ifteenth century (115). 
The turbulent circumstances of politica! !ife in Italy brought Bruni 
and others to cons ider the science of poli tics more carefully, and 
inaugurated a pe1iod of Fiorentine specu lation that culminateci in the 
wri tings of Niccolò Machiavelli (11 6). Later proponents of modern 
(110) /b id. 2, 3, IO f. 
(l Il) St. T homas Aquinas, Su m ma Theologiae 2, l Question 91. 
(112) lbid. Question 91, second Article. 
(113) See e. g. John F. Wippe l, Metaphysics, in Norman Kretzmann - Eleonore Sn1mp 
(eds.). The Cambridge Compani011 to Aquinas, Cambridge 1993, 85 ff. 
( 11 4) In fact, the relationship was not so clear cut, and the scholast ic tradition made 
considerable contributions to emergent humanism. See Quentin Skinne r T/re Foundations of 
Modem Politica/ Thought, l, Cambridge 1978, 49 ff. 
(115) On the importance of translations, see Richard Tuck, Philosophy and Govemmenl 
cit., 13. 
(116) See Quentin Skinner, Foundations cit. , 74 ff. 
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politica! science would credit Machiavelli with having been «the first who 
revived the ancient politics» (117). This cannot ha ve been entirely true in a 
Europe which had been reading Cicero and Aristotle for centuries, but 
there does seem to have been a quantitive change at the beginning of the 
sixteenth century (118). Machiavelli 's Discorsi sopra la prima de ca di Tito 
Livio inaugurated a new conversation about how well-structured legai 
institutions might make men, if not good, at least useful to themselves and 
to society (119). 
When proponents of modem poli tica] science set out in the late 
eighteenth century to furnish examples of the ' reading and reasoning' 
which inspired constituti onal governme nt (120), they bega n wi th 
Cicero (l21), supported by excerpts from Tacitus(l22), Aristotle(l23), 
Polybius(l24), and Livy(l25), but then there was a great leap across the 
centuries to Machiavelli, concerning how Rome' s constitutional checks 
and balances had (through the fortitous intervention of history), gradually 
worked their way towards perfection (1 26). Machiavelli remained a 
somewhat suspect figure, discredited by his writings on princes (127), but 
students of govemment took his proposals seriously (128), including his 
praise for the republican government of Rome(l29). 
Machiavelli 's Discorsi on Livy made him to some extent the «great 
restorer of true politics» in Europe (130), but as the author of Il Principe h e 
also vastly strengthened a rival style of government, based on the absolute 
power of princes. Machiavelli was frank in recognizing that princes will 
do what they must to maintain their power (131), and this encouraged a 
secular theory of absolute power, which threatened the modern rule of 
(117) John Adams, Defence cit., I. 325. Cf. ILI. 210. 
(118) Among the recent authors who shared this vie w is J . G. A. Pocock , The 
Machiavellian Moment: Fiorentine Politica! Thought and the Atlantic Republican 1ì"adition, 
Pri nceton 197 5. 
(119) John Adams, Defence cit., at I. 133 f. 
(120) lbid. I. xv. 
(J2J) Jbid. l. XVI- XVIn. 
(122) Jbid. l. XVI. 
(123) lbid. l. 125. 
(1 24) lbid. I. 169 ff. 
(125) lbid. I. 125. 
(126) lbid. l. 141-147, quoting Niccolò Machiavelli, Discorsi sopra la prima decadi Tito 
Livio I 2, and especially l 2, 36: «ma rimanendo mista, fece una republica perfetta>>. 
(127) John Adams, Defence cit. , I. 325. 
{128) lbid. II. 241-250. 
(129) lbid. l. 147. 
(130) lbid. m. 210. 
(131) See e. g. Niccolò Machiavell i, Il Principe, chapter Vlll. 
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la w (132). After the St. Bartholomew' s Day massacre of August 24, 1572, 
the French Huguenot Innocent Gentill et did permanent damage to 
Machiavelli 's reputation by pointing out in his Discours sur les moyens de 
bien gouverner contre Nicolas Machiavel the pernicious effects of 
separating a prince's interests from those of his subjects(133). Having 
revived the ancient conversation about the science of politics, Machiavelli 
damaged his legacy by supplementing his study of Jiberty with a manual 
for princes(l34). 
6. The Enemies of Liberty 
Thomas Hobbes spoke for many in his famous attack on Cicero and 
Aristotle, when h e sai d that «by reading of these Greek, and Latine 
Authors, men from their childhood have gotten a habit (under a falseshew 
of Liberty) of favouring tumults, and of licentious controlling the actions 
of their Soveraigns; an d again of controlling those controllers, with the 
effusion of so much blood ; as I think I may truly say, there was never 
anything so deerly bought, as these Western parts bave bought the learning 
of the Greek and Latine tongues» (135). Hobbes wrote at the end of a great 
ci vi l war, which led him to conclude that «without ... Arbitrary 
government, ... Warre must be perpetuall» (136). He denounced ancient 
advocates of the rule of Iaw for their «pernicious error» and preferred the 
decisi ve power of rulers ab le t o «kill or hurt» their disobedient 
subjects (137). Hobbes supported the arbitrary power of government, 
because he feared that «masterlesse men» will always be in «perpetuall 
war» with their neighbors (l38). 
Hobbes ' reaction to the horrors of the English Civil War is significant 
for three reasons: first, because he conflrms the great influence of Cicero 
(and Aristotle) against arbitrary governments; second, because Hobbes 
displayed a typical reaction to civil conflict, in his hope for peace at all 
(132) See e. g. William Shakespeare T/te Meny Wives of Windsor (1602), Host : <<Am I 
politic? Am l subtle? Am l Machiavel?>>. 
(133) lnnocent Gentillet, Discours sur les moyens de bien gouvemer et maintenir en 
bonne paix 1111 Royaume ou azare Pri11cipauté co11tre Nicolas Machiavel Florentin, Geneva 
1576. 
(134) See Niccolò Machiavelli, Il Principe, chapter I. 
(135) Thomas Hobbes, Leviatlwn, o r the Matte1; Fonne, and Power of a Commonwealth 
Eclesiastica/1 and Civili (1651), ed. Richard Tuck, Cambridge 1996, chapter 21, IlO f. (p. 159-
160). 
(136) lbid. chapter 46, 377 (p. 471). 
(137) lbid. 26, 137 (p. 183). 
(138) /bid. 21, IlO (p. 149). Cf. chapter 13, 62 (p. 88 f.). 
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costs; and third because Hobbes inaugurates a new stage in the defense of 
absolute government against the Jimitations of reason as applied to law. 
Conventional apologies for «absolute monarchy» (139) would ha ve re lied 
o n divine election as the justification an d source of ali pubi i c offices (140). 
The Stuart kings claimed parental authority aver their subjects(l41), for 
which they declared themselves to be answerable to God alone(J42). But 
Hobbes' Leviathan made very little use of religion in arguing for absolute 
government, and accepted the ancie nt starting point of nature in 
constructing c ivil society. Hobbes denigrated most c laims of «right 
reason» as simple assertions of personal opinion(l43), but stili developed 
hi s own argument on a scientific basis( l44). Hobbes differs from Cicero 
and Aristotle, not in the value that he p laces on reason (145), but rather in 
fearing the likely conseguences of balanced government or 'Jiberty' , when 
applied to la w and political authority (146). 
Like his Christian predecessors, Augustine and Aguinas, Hobbes 
challenged Cicero 's influence by subverting his vocabu lary. 'Liberty' fa r 
Cicero, as for most Europeans prior to Hobbes, signified subjection to no 
man, but only to just and egual Jaws, made for the common good of 
society (J47). Hobbes redefined « liberty» as «the absence of externall 
impediments» (1 48). This meant either that ali laws, just and unjust, are 
vio lations of liberty, or that none are (149), but in any case obscured the 
difference between free and despoti c governments. 'Right' and 'Wrong' , 
'Justice' and 'Inj ustice', according to Hobbesian definitions, do not exist 
until there is law, and Jaw itself does not exist without a dominant power 
to enforce it(J50). Leviathan relies on the doctrine that «a kingdom 
divided in itself cannot stand » to disparage checks and balances in 
govemment (l51). Hobbes accepted the ancient values of reason and the 
(1 39) See e. g. James Stuart, The Trew Law of Free Monarchie.\· (1598), ed. Johann 
P. Somrnerville, Cambridge 1994, 64. 
(140) !bi d. 8 l. 
(141) lbid. 65. 
(142) lbid. 81 f. 
(143) Thornas Hobbes, Leviathan ci t. 
(144) lbid. 5, 21 (p. 35). 
(145) lbid. 5, 22 (p. 36): «Reason is the pace; Encrease of Science, the way, and the 
Benefit of man-kind, the end>>. 
(146) lbid. 21, IlO (p. 149). 
(147) For a collection of citations to Cicero on liberty, see M. N. S. Sell ers, The Sacred 
Fire of Liberty, chapter 8: Cicero's Conception of Liberi)•. 
(148) Thomas Hobbes, Leviathon cit. 14, 64 (p. 91). 
(149) lbid. 21, 109 (p. 147). 
(150) lbid. 14, 65 (p. 90). 
(151) lbid. 18, 93 (p. 127). 
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conunon good as the ultimate purposes of government and law(l52), but 
relied entirely on the will and power of those in authority to secure as 
much reason and justice as they saw fit. 
Hobbes was unusual among the enemies of liberty and constitutional 
governme nt in hi s li mited and eccentric re li ance on religious 
authority(153). This restricted his immediate influence, but made him the 
father of a lasting and powerful school of European absolutists (154). 
Hobbes renewed and revised the old imperia! claim that princeps legibus 
solutus est, w ithout makin g a ny direc t appeal to s upern atural 
authority(155). More typical among H obbes' contemporaries and 
immediate successors was Robert Filmer, whose Patriarcha established 
the ' natura! power of Kings' on the basis of scripture and divine 
sanction(l56). But otherwise their arguments were very much the same. 
Filmer feared the «fickleness» and «dissensions» of popular sovereignty 
which «shed an ocean of blood within Italy and the streets of 
Rome» (157). He argued that «the cruelty of ali the tyrannical emperors 
that ever ruled in this city di d ... [not] spill a quarter of the blood that was 
poured out in the las t hundred years of her glorious commonwealth» (158). 
'Tyrants', a t their worst, Filmer argued, only oppress a few particular 
unfortunate men, because their self-interest prompts them generally to 
support the w e l fare of their subjects (159). 
The English Civil War illustrates the great and continuing difficulty 
of moving from government by arbitrary power towards government by 
reason and the rule of law. Those with power will fight to maintain it, 
making the simple injustice of despotism seem mild in comparison to the 
greater misery of open warfare. Hobbes, Filmer, and Machiavelli sought 
justice from princes, knowing they could not expect it, because they feared 
the consequences of upsetting the establ ished order. The English Civil War 
was a watershed of emergent modernity, because it clarified the centrai 
issued of mode rn law and politics. Ali sides now conceded that 
(!52) lbid. 5, 22 (p. 36). 
(153) lbid. dedication to Francis Godolphin (p. 3). 
(154) See e. g. Quentin Skinner, Vìsions of Politics, III. Hobbes and Civil Science, 
Cambridge 2002. 
(155) Digest l. 3. 31. Cf. Hobbes, Leviatha1t 26, 137 f. (p. 184). 
(156) Sir Robert Filmer, Patriarcha or the Natura/ Power of Kings, London 1680. 
Filmer cited St. Ambrose and St. Augustine to support the proposition that kings are bound 
by no laws (at 3. 3). Following Ulpian 's doctrine that princeps legibus solullls est. (at 3, 8). 
(157) lbid. chapter 2, Il. Cf. 2, 14: <<The b1ood hath been sucked up in the market places 
with sponges; the river Tiber hath been filled with the dead bodies of the citizens, and the 
conunon privies stuffed full with them>>. 
(158) lbid. 2, 15. 
(159) /bi d .: <<out of natmal love to himself, every tyrant desires to preserve the li ves and 
protect the goods of his subjects». 
262 MORT!MER N. S. SELLERS 
governments should apply reason to nature to secure the common good of 
their subjects. What remained in question was how (or whether) politica! 
science could best secure this result. The enemies of liberty drew a line at 
the science of politics. «For forms of government !et fools contest ; 
whate 'er is best administer'd is best» (l60). 
7. The English Revolution 
The prorninence of Cicero in the European development of rhetoric, 
in humanism, and in the renaissance of European culture, set the stage for 
his influence on modern la w (161), but Cicero's impact on European 
politica! institutions remained limited, unti! the breakdown of imperia! 
power and the wars of religion opened a space for politica! speculation, 
and the possibility of politica! change. The 'Glorious Revolution' of 1688 
can be seen on one level as the triumph of a Protestant people against their 
Catholic ruler at the tail end of religious reformation of Europe. From 
another standpoint, however, the ouster of James II signified the beginning 
of a new legai era of modern constitutionalism. The primary complaints of 
his subjects against the king concemed questions of constitutionallaw, and 
his successors accepted a constitutional settlement, as a condition of their 
tenure on the throne (162). 
Cicero had argued for checks and balances in government, that could 
take advantage of monarchie, aristocratic and democratic elements in 
public adrninistration to better advance the public interest (l63). He wrote 
of 'mixed ' (permixtus) government(l64), as did Aristotle (165), and this 
had sufficient resonance in England (and elsewhere) (1 66) that Sir Thomas 
Smith understood the government of Elizabeth' s England to be ' rnixt' in 
1565 (1 67) . Even the absolutist monarch King Charles I of England 
(160) Alexander Pope, Essay 0 11 Man, London 1733, Epistle Ili : Ofthe Nature and State 
of Man, with Respect to Society. On which see John Adams, Thoughts an Government 
(1776) : <<Pope flattered tyrants too much >> . 
(161) See the Alli of previous Colloquia Tulliana, and particulary Cicerone nel 
Medioevo (<< Ciceroniana >> Xl ), Roma 2000, and Cicerone nell 'Uma/lesimo europeo 
(<<Ciceroniana» IX), Roma 1996. 
(162) An Act Declaring the Rights and Liberties of the Subject and Selting the 
Successi an of the Crown (1689). 
(163) Cic. rep. I, 69. Cf. ibid. 2, 41. 
(164) Ibid. I , 45. 
(165) Aristot. poli t. 1265b, 35 ff.; 1294b, I3 ff. 
(166) H. G. Koenigsburger (ed.), Republiken und Republikanismus im Europa der 
friihen Neuzeit, Mi.inchen I988. 
(167) Sir Thomas Smith, De Republica Ang/orum, London I583, book I, chapter 6. Cf. 
book n, chapter l. 
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conceded under pressure that England's constitution was a 'mixture' of 
absolute monarchy, aristocracy and democracy with a 'balance' between 
the three estates(l68). The innovation that followed England's revolution 
was not so much in the idea of ' mi xture' as it was in the strengthened role 
of popular sovereignty, and the 'institution ' of 'popular commonwealths' 
that h ad been so much feared an d despised by Thomas Hobbes (169). 
Hobbes' attack on the «Specious name of Libertie» (170) evoked an 
immediate response from James Harrington, whose Commonwealth of 
Oceana (1656) set out to defend Cicero, Aristotle, and their «ancient 
prudence» of government in the public in teres t (17 1) against the 
implications of Leviathan, which seemed to encourage government in the 
interest of the rulers, or rather : an «empire of men and not of laws». ( l72) 
Securing the more desirable «empire of laws and not of men» (173) 
de pended, Harring ton s uggested, on mai ntaini ng a deliberati ve 
senate (l74), to contro] (as Cicero proposed) the natura! intemperance of 
the comitia(l75). Hanington cited Cicero's criticism of plebiscites(l76) 
but also his insistence that no Iegislation could be valid, without a vote in 
the popular assembly (l77). He di sliked the excesses of England 's 
unicameral Commonwealth Parliament, which ruled without checks and 
balances, as much as he feared Hobbes' despotic absolute monarch (178). 
Harrington pointed out (correctly) that neither Cicero nor Aristotle would 
have supported any such arrangement(I79). 
The 'old cause' of liberty and balanced government that Sidney 
praised on the scaffold (l80), had been on the boil in England for most of 
the seventeenth century, fired by theories of law, government, and the 
constitution first li t by Cicero and his contemporaries in the last years of 
Rome's liberty, and shortly afterwards(181). Subsequent revolutions in 
(168) Charles Stuart, His Majesties Answer to Nineteen Propositions of Both Houses of 
Parliament (1642). 
(169) Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, 21, IlO (p. 149 f.). 
(170) Jbid. 21, IlO (p. 149). 
(171) James Harrington, The Commonwealth of Oceana (1656), ed. J. G. A . Pocock, 
Cambridge 1992, preliminaries (p. 8). 
(172) Jbid. 9. 
(173) lbid. 8. 
(174) lbid. 23 f. 
(175) /bi d. 149, quoting Cic. Flacc. 9 ff.; 16. 
(176) Harrington, The Commonwealth of Oceano, 74. 
(177) Jbid. 16, citing Cic. Piane 12-30. 
(178) Jbid. 65. 
(179) lbid. 
(180) Algemon Sidney, speech de livered to the she riff on the scaffo ld (December 7, 
1683). 
(181) For some of the highlights in this tradition, see M. N . S. Sellers, The Sacred Fire 
of Liberry ci t. 
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modero law would consult the tracts of these English disputes alongside 
Cicero, Sallust, Livy and Tacitus, because the subject-matter was the 
sa me (182). The question was ho w bes t to structure the «right constitution 
of a commonwealth» to avoid the «simple monarchy » and «absolute 
power» imposed by Caesar and hi s successors, and e mbraced by 
Hobbes (183). 
James Hanington gave a very clear and succinct exposition of 
reason, law, and goverrunent, as applied to the constitution of England at 
the height of Engli sh inten·egnum (184). Hanington mourned the liberty 
«ex tinguished» by the «arms of Caesar» (185). He proposed that 
magistrates «should govern according to reason», secured by careful 
'mixture' in the constitution of the state (l86). This 'doctrine of the 
ancients' had been developed by the senatus populusque Romanus(187) 
according to the principle censuere patl·es, iussit populus described by 
Cicero(l88). The checks and balances of a well-constructed government 
will bring forward «reason in the debate of the commonwealth», which is 
the law. And «if the liberty of a man consist in the empire of his reason, 
the absence whereof would betray him unto the bondage of his passions, 
then the liberty of a commonwealth consisteth in the empire of her laws, 
the absence whereof would betray her unto the lusts of the tyrants» (189). 
James Harrington considered this «equality of power» to be «the liberty 
not only of the commonwealth, but of every man» in it( l90). 
Cicero and his English successors sought a «common right, law of 
nature, or interest of the w ho le» (191 ), which is «right reason» (192). More 
important than recognizing this principle, however, was to construct such 
«Orders of government» as would constrain the citizens and magistrates to 
take up «the common good» (193). English theorists proposed the election 
of a 'Senate', or second chamber in the legislature, with members chosen 
(1 82) John Adams, Dr!;{ence, Il l. 2 11 mentions James Harrington, John Milton, Aigernon 
Sidney, John Locke, Benjamin Hoadley, James Trenchard, Thomas Gordon, Henry Neville, 
and Marchamont Needham. 
(183) << A man, however unhappy in his temper, or detestable for his principies, equa! in 
genius and leam ing to any of his contemporar ies» (ibid.). 
(184) The ' Preliminaries' to his Oceano are particularly lucid. James Harrington, The 
Commonwealth of Oceana (1656), ed. J. G. A . Pocock, Cambridge 1992. 
(185) lbid. 8. 
(186) lbid. IO. 
(187) Jbid. 
(188) lbid. 14. Cf. Cic. rep. 2, 32 etc . 
(189) James Harrington, The Commonwealth of Oceana c it. , 19 f. 
(190) Jbid. 20. 
(1 91) lbid. 21. 
(192) lbid. 22. 
(193) lbid. 
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«for their excellent parts», not to be «conunanders», but «counselors» of 
the people(l94). Both Harrington and Sidney endorsed Cicero' s proposal 
that all legislation should be approved auctoritate patrwn et iussu populi, 
by the authority of the Senate and order of the people, «which concUJTing 
make a la w» (195). Both believed, c iting Cicero, Plato and Aristotle, that 
the only purpose of ali public officials «always and everywhere» is to do 
«justice an d procure the welfare of those that create them» (196). Both 
defined law and justice to be, as Sidney put it (using Cicero's words), 
«sanctio recta, j ubens, honesta, prohibens contraria» ( 197). 
Algernon Sidney wrote his Discourses to counter the arguments of 
Filmer and Hobbes, and to vindicate the value of government that 
«proportion[ed] the powers of severa! magistracies» so that «they might 
ali concur in procuring the publick good». Sidney wanted, like Cicero, to 
«divide the powers between the magistrates and people», so that «a well-
regulated harmony might be preserved in the w ho le» (198). Where Hobbes 
and Filmer tried to threaten these doctrines of Cicero, Sidney defended 
them (199), arguing that «the Glory, Yirtue, an d Power of the Romans 
began and ended with their liberty » (200). Once Augustus destroyed the 
Roman constitution and usurped ali law and justice for himself (omnium 
jura in se tra.xerat), then liberty was at an end, and the era of «miserable 
slavery» began (201). Sidney suggested that «Roman greatness» justified a 
close attention to «what passed among them», but only as to «what they 
did, said, or thought when they enjoyed that liberty which was the mother 
and nurse of their virtue», and «the laws were more powerful than the 
commands of men»(202). 
Filmer' s arguments against the rule of la w and constitutional 
government had been primarily reli gious, and so were many elements of 
Algernon Sidney's response. Sidney compared James II to the French royal 
house of Yalois (which had slaughtered the Protestants of France), to Philip 
II of Spain (w ho had slaughtered the Protestants of the Netherlands), and to 
the «sweetness and apostolica! meekness of the lnquisition» (which made a 
generai practice of slaughter){203). This reflected the religious, as well as 
(194) lbid. 23. 
(195) lbid. 24. Cf. Algernon Sidney, Discourses Concerning Govemmenl (1698), ed. 
Thomas G. West, Indianapolis 1990, 2, 13 (p. 151). 
(196) lbid l , 20 (p. 70). 
(197) lbid. 3, IO (p. 379). Cf. 3. 21 (p. 443). 
(198) lbid. l, l (p. 6). 
(199) lbid. l , 16 (p. 48). 
(200) lbid. 2, 12 (p. 144). 
(201) lbid. 3, 24 (p. 455), paraphrasing Tac. a11n. l , 2. 
(202) Algernon Sidney, Discourses Co11cemi11g Govemmenl cit., 3, 26 (p. 472). 
(203) lbid. 3, 43 (p. 562). 
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the politica!, nature of the stmggle. John Locke, w ho also wrote in response 
to Filmer, divided his argument into two books, the first of which rested 
almost entirely on the Bible (204). Locke too opposed the «Siavery» (205) of 
«absolute power» (206) with «reason», (presented as the « Voice of God» in 
man)(207). Like Cicero, Aristotle, and Sidney , Locke identified the only 
purpose of politica! power as the «Publick Good» (208) and sought the 
public good through «Reason», which is the «La w of Nature » (209). 
John Locke was a partisan of «Our great Restorer», King Will iam 
III (21 0), which inhibited his precision about the details of constitutional 
government(211 ), beyond his flat opposition to «Arbitrary Power» (212) and 
commitmen t to the sovereignty of the people(213). The Glorious 
Revolution established both of these principles, and their basis in «the 
Foundation and End of all Laws», which is «the publick good» (214), but 
could not shake the power of regnum(215) or the continuing importance of 
religious conforrnity. William and Mary invaded England «to save the 
Protestant religion» (216) , and the «Declaration of Rights» which 
confirmed their succession concerned the safety of «the Protestant» religion 
as much as it did «the laws and liberties» of the kingdom (217). Thus 
although the rhetoric and result of the English Revolution very much 
advanced the cause of reason and balanced government in law, the English 
still had one foot in the premodem world of royalty and religious authority. 
8. Reason, Religion, and the Law 
The fina! steps towards modernity in European law and government 
took piace, not so much in the «Glorious» Revolution itself (218), as in its 
(204) John Locke, Two Trearises ofGovem me111 (1690), ed. Pe ter Laslett, Cambridge 1988. 
(205) /bi d. l' l (p. 141). 
(206) lbid. l , 2 (p. 141). 
(207) lbid. l , 86 (p. 205). 
(208) lbid. 2, 3 (p. 268). 
(209) Jbid. 2, 6 (p. 271). Cf. 2, IO (p. 273): << right Ru1e of Reason>>. 
(210) Jbid. Preface (p. 137). 
(211) Benjarrùn Rush spoke for many when he identi fied Locke as useful for the 
'principles', but no t for the fo rms of government. Observations Upon the Present 
Government of Pennsylvania, Phi1adelphia 1777, 20. Cf. Adams, Defence, ll!. 365 f.; 370. 
(2 12) Locke, Two Treatises, 2, 137 (p. 359). 
(213) lbid. 2, 149 (p. 367). 
(214) Jbid. 2, 165 (p. 378). 
(215) Sidney had been bolder, Discourses cit., at 3, l (p. 322). 
(216) Letter of the ' Imrnortal Seven' to William of Orange (June 30, 1688). 
(21 7) An Act Declaring the Rights and Liberties of the Subject and Se/1/ing the 
Succession of the Crown (1689). 
(2 18) The phrase was coined by John Hampden, grandson of the Par1iamentary hero. 
L. G. Schwoerer, The Revolution o.f 1688-89: Changing Perspectives, Cambridge 2004. 
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echoes and memory across Europe. The baron de Montesquieu, for 
example, admired the English of his ti me as «Un peuple libre», formed by 
the principles of their constitution, which helped to shape the mores, 
manners, and character of the nation (219). Tbe English Revolution had 
only positive effects «cru: !es révolutions que forme la liberté ne sont 
qu 'une confirmation de la liberté»(220). People living under such a 
constitu tion willlove tbeir liberty, Montesquieu believed, «parce que cette 
liberté serait vraie» (221). Ali citizens should ha ve tbis freedom to tbink 
for themselves about religion, to embrace the faith of their choice, or none, 
and to be untroubled in their lives and goods and politics by tbe public 
involvement of religious autbority(222). 
Montesquieu's attitude towards law and religion, which be attributed 
to the English, reflected bis early reading of Cicero, as it did among the 
English themselves. James Hanington insisted on liberty of conscience, 
citing Cicero's « most excelle nt book», De natura deorum(223). 
Montesquieu wrote that be too had read tbese pages of Cicero with 
pleasure, because they confounded the pretentions of all sects equally, 
without favoritism (224). Cicero was, for Montesquieu, among ali the 
ancients, the one with the greatest personal merit, «et à qui j 'aimerais 
mieux ressembler» (225). Reading Cicero inspired Montesquieu to 
eloquence and emulation of the great «Jibérateur de la patrie» and 
«défenseur de la liberté» (226), w ho m ade philosophy, like reason, 
available to everyone (227). Cicero formed our morals, Montesquieu 
reported, and showed us our duty to follow reason, without passion, 
despite the threat of certain death (228). «Nous leur devons ces beaux 
ouvrages qui seront admirés par toutes !es sectes et dans toutes les 
révolutions de la philosophie» (229). 
Roman policies concerning religion differed from those of other 
nations, as Montesquieu explained it, because the Romans had designed 
(219) Charles-Louis de Secondat, baron de la Brède et de Montesquieu, De L'Esprit des 
Lois, Geneva 1748, ed. Robert Derathé, Paris 1973 at 19, 27 (p. 346) Cf. l t, 6. 
(220) lbid. 19, 27 (p. 348). 
(221) lbid. 
(222) lbid, 19, 27 (p. 351 f.). Cf. 25, 13. 
(223) James Harrington, The Commonwealth of Oceana (1656) ed. 1. G. A. Pocock, 
Cambridge 1992, Preliminaries, p. 40. 
(224) Charles-Louis de Secondat, baron de la Brède et de Montesquieu, Discours sur 
Cicéron cit., 94. 
(225) Ibid. 93. 
(226) lbid. 
(227) Ibid. 94. 
(228) Ibid. 95. 
(229) !bi d. 97. 
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their religion to serve the state, an d no t their state to serve religion (230). 
Religion had no voice in public affairs, without permission of the 
magistrates(231), and religious questions were settled by considering the 
public good (232). By subordinating religious institutions to the public 
welfare (Montesq uieu suggested), the Romans had succeeded in preventing 
«superstition » from oppressing the republic(233). Montesquieu did not 
disparage or oppose religion any more than Cicero had, but wanted religion 
to serve the public good (234 ). The ai m in re ligious institutions, as in all 
other constitutional arrangements, should be civic harmony, «qui fait que 
toutes les parti es, quelques opposées qu' elles nous pa.raissent, concourent 
au bien général de la sociéte comme des dissonances dans la musique 
concourent à l'accord total» (235). 
Montesquieu' s conceptions of law, politics, religion and govemment 
followed and often paraphrased Cicero in seeking to apply reason, not only 
to the Iaws themselves, but to the structures that create and maintain the 
Iaws, through the checks and balances of constitutional government (236). 
Montesquieu did not seek (as some had) «l'accord du despotisme 
asiatique» (237), but rather the balanced concord of divided public powers, 
which check, contro!, and support each other(238). As soon as Romans 
changed thei r institutions, Rome failed, because the Romans had 
abandoned the principles that had made Rome strong(239). When the 
Christian emperors tried to strengthen the faith by coercion, they simpl y 
weakened the state, to the detriment of all citizens and ultimate ruin of thei.r 
nation (240). 
(230) Charles-Louis de Secondat, baron de la Brède et de Montesquieu, Dissertation sur 
la politique des Romains dans la religion (1716) in Oeuvres Complètes ed. Roger Caillois, 
Paris 1956, 81. 
(231) Ibid. 82. 
(232) Ibid. 83. 
(233) /bi d. 89. 
(234) Charles-Louis de Secondat, baron de la Brède et de Montesquieu, Considérarion.1· 
sur /es causes de la grandeur des Romains et de leur decadence (1734), eh. IO: «Outre que la 
religion est toujours le meilleur garant que l' on puisse avoir des mreurs des homnes, il y avait 
ceci de particulier chez les Romains, qu'ils melaient quelque sentiment religieux à l'amour 
qu ' ils avaient pour leur patrie>>. 
(235) lbid. eh. 9. Cf. Cic. rep. 2, 69. 
(236) As illustrated for exarnple, in the two passages compared in the previous footnote. 
(237) Montesquieu, Considérations, eh. 9. 
(238) lbid. eh. Il : <<Les lois de Rome avaient sagement divisé la puissance publique en 
un grand nombre de magistratures, qui se soutenaient, s' arretaient, et se tempéraient l'une 
l 'autre ... >>. 
(239) lbid. eh. 18: <<Ce n'est pas la Fortune qui domine le monde. On peut demander 
aux Romai ns, qui eurent une sui te continuelle de prospérités quand ils se gouvemèrent sur un 
certain pian, et une suite non interrompue de revers lorsqu' ils se conduisirent sur un autre>>. 
(240) lbid. eh. 20: <<Camme les anciens Romains fortifiè rent leur empire en y laissant 
toute sorte de culle, dans la suite on le réduisit à rien en coupant, l'une après l'autre, les 
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Cicero' s dialogue de natura deorum made the radica! argument that 
justice has nothing to do with divinity, but only with the needs of human 
society an d the community of mankind (24 l ). The gods w ili no t step in to 
regniate the world (242), and right and wrong are right and wrong in 
themselves, without need for gods make them so(243). Cicero suggested 
(through the character of Cotta) that the nature of divinity is necessruily 
obscure (244), des pite it s o bv ious utility in enco uraging good 
behavior (245). Thus Hugo Grotius' famous statement that the basic 
principles of reason, law, and justice would remain the same, etiamsi 
daremus there was no God at ali (246). Removing religious authority from 
government cast the responsibility for justice back onto reason, and to the 
guidance of whatever constitutional structure would best contro] and 
motivate the public powers to secure the common good of ali those subject 
to the law(247). 
9. The American Revolution 
Cicero was primmily a lawyer, a politician, and a philosopher of law. 
His influence and authority arose, not from force of arms or military 
power, but tì·om the force of argument and persuasion. With the growth of 
learning in Europe, the class of such men became Jru·ger. Johan van 
Oldenbarnevelt and Hugo Grotius set an example as politica! lawyers in 
the States of Holland that John Hampden and John Pym elaborated in 
England 's Parliament, but always in the shadow of monarchy and religion. 
At the end of the seventeenth century Johan de Witt and Algernon Sidney 
stili found themselves fighting a losing battle for Cicero's legai and 
constitutional ideals against latter-day Caesars in the Netherlands and 
scctes qui ne dominaient pas .. .. il crut avoir augmenté le nombre des fidèles; il n 'avait fai t 
que dimi nuer celui des hommes». 
(241) Cic. 11a1. 3, 38. 
(242) lbid. 3, 85. 
(243) lbid. 3, 87 f. 
(244) lbid. 3, 93. 
(245) lbid. l, 118. 
(246) Hugo Grotius, De iure belli ac pacis, libri tres, i11 qui bus jus 11aturae et ge111ium, 
item juris publici praecipua exp/ic:a/1/Ur, revised ed., Amsterdam 1646, Pro/egome11a 11: <<Et 
haec quidem quae jam diximus, locum aliquem haberent e tiamsi daremus, quod si ne summo 
scelere dare nequit, non esse Deum ... » . Grotius bega n his book with an appeal to Ci ce ro 
(Prolegome11a 2) against those who claim (Prolegome11a 3) that : «regi aut civitati imperium 
habenti , nihil injustum quod utile». 
(247) Charles-Louis de Secondat, baron de la Brède et de Montesquieu, De des 
Lois cit., Il , 4 : << Pour qu'on ne puisse abuser du pouvoir, il faut que par la disposition des 
choses, le pouvoir le pouvoir». 
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Great Blitain(248). Only finally in the eighteenth century did European 
legai modernism finally shake off the shackles of the intervening 
centuries, to approach ideals that Cicero had advanced at the end of the 
liberty of Rome(249). 
The triumph of Western legai modemism carne first, not in the center 
of the European world, but on its extreme periphery, along the eastern 
littoral of British North America. American lawyers were products of the 
Glorious Revolution, but without the royal presence or the uniformity in 
religion that constrained their British contemporaries. James Trenchard 
and Thomas Gordon, writing as 'Cato ' in England, had summarized the 
Whig consensus of their era, praising the principles of Cicero, and 
mourning the loss of his Republic(250). 'Cato' translated, quoted, and 
commented on correspondence of Cicero and Brutus, because «the same 
Principles of Nature and Reason that supported Liberty at Rome, must 
support it here and everywhere». Trenchard and Gordon knew that «the 
foundations of tyranny are in ali countries, and at all times, essentially the 
same; namely ... power without a balance»(251). But even Trenchard and 
Gordon felt it necessary to confirm their subservience to the King(252). 
Americans could aspire to the eloquence, principles, and policies of Cicero 
without sharing so immediately their English cousins' fear of punishment 
by the hereditary powers of the state (253). 
American attitudes were steeped in the same classica! readings and 
values that had formed the British 'Cato', but in a much purer and 
unadulterated form, because their libraries were smaller(254). British 
(248) See Charles-Edouard Levillain, William 1/l's Military and Politica! Career in 
Neo-Roman Context, 1672-1702, <<The Historical Joumal» 48, 2005, 321-350. 
(249) For a history of the nach/eben of Roman liberty, see M. N. S. Sellers, The SaCI·ed 
Fire of Liberty cit. Cf. Quentin Skinner, Liberty Before Liberalism, Cambridge 1998. 
(250) John Trenchard - Thomas Gordon, Cato 's Lellers or Essays on Liberty, Civil and 
Religious, and Other lmportam Subjects (1721), ed. Ronald Hamowy, lndianapolis 1995, 
letter no. 26, Aprii 22, 1721 (p. 188 f.). 
(251) lbid. preface, p. 15. 
(252) lbid. preface, p. 13 f. 
(253) Mercy Otis Warren, History of the Rise, Progress and Termination of the 
American Revollllion Imerspersed with Biographica/, Politica/ and Mora/ Observations, 
Boston 1805, ed. Lester H. Cohen, l ndianapolis 1988, volume I, eh. l, 5 (p. 5): <<The Jove of 
domination and an uncontrollable lust far arbitrary power. .. prevailed ... in the decline of 
Roman virtue, and in the dark pages of British story. It was these principles that overtumed 
that ancient republic .. .l t was resistance t o them that brought o ne of their monarchs t o the 
block, and struck another from his throne. Il was the prevalence of them that drove the flrst 
se ttlers of America fTom elegant habitations and affluent circumstances, lo seek an asylum in 
the cold and uncultivated regions of the western world . Oppressed in Britain by despotic 
kings, an d persecuted by prelati c fury, they fled t o a distant country, w h ere the desires of 
man were bounded by lhe wants of nature ... ». 
(254) David Ramsay, The History of the American Revolution (Philadelphia 1789), ed. 
Lester H. Cohen, lndianapolis 1990, chapter l (p. 29). 
r 
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colonists were jealous of their liberty, when they considered it threatened, 
and defended themselves with legai, constitutional , and classica! 
arguments, in conscious inùtation of Cicero(255). Dr. Joseph Warren, the 
first great martyr of the American Revolution, k.illed at Bunker Hill in 
1775, wore a «Ciceronian toga» into Old South Meetinghouse in Boston to 
declaim against the king(256), and James Otis rested his argument for 
American rights (in 1764) on Cicero's theory that «the superstructures 
and the whole adnùnistration [of government] should be conformed to the 
law of universall reason» (257). Otis argued that Britain' s balanced 
constitution gave Britons the world's best form of government since the 
usurpation of Caesar destroyed «the Roman glory and grandeur», but that 
British politicians, like Caesar, had subverted the balance of governrnent, 
and undermined the legitimacy of the state(258). 
The American Revolution from the beginning opposed «kingcraft» 
and «priestcraft» (as Otis explained it), because arbitrary politica! or 
religious authority was inimicai to «government [for] the good of 
mankind » (259). Americans followed Cicero in making the «la w of nature 
and of reason» their fina] measure of the state (260). After the Declaration 
of Independence in 1776 they needed new forms of government to replace 
the discredited structures of colonia! role. Cicero provided a name 
(' republic'), a goal (' liberty'), and a technique (checks and balances) for 
the new American constitutions. John Adams promoted this template for 
the American state governments in a letter to Richard Henry Lee, 
published as Thoughts on Govemment in 1776, in which he insisted that 
«there is no good government but what is republican». Adams defined a 
repubhc as a «government of laws and not of men», arguing that whatever 
form of government best secures just and impartial laws, deserved to be 
established in the states. Adams suggested a bicameral government with a 
popular assembly, as in Rome, controlled by a second legislative chamber 
(the 'Senate') and an elected executive(261). «We shalllearn to prize the 
checks and balances of a free government» (Adams later explained) «if we 
(255) Stephen Botein, Cicero as a Role Mode/ for Early American Lawyers: A Case 
Study in Classica/ lnjluence, <<The Classica! Journal>> 73, 1978, 313-321. 
(256) Rivington's New York Gazeteer (March 15, 1775). 
(257) James Otis, Rights of the British Colonies Asserted and Proved (1764). 
(258) lbid. 
(259) lbid. 
(260) lbid. 
(261) John Adams, Thoughts 011 Govemment (Boston, 1776), in Charles S. Hyneman -
Donald S. Lutz (eds.), American Politica/ Writi11g during the Founding Era, 1770-1805, l , 
lndianapolis 1983, 403 ff. 
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recollec t the miseri es . .. which aro se» from trying to li ve wi thout 
them (262). 
The leaders of the American Revolution (and many of the ir 
supporters throughout Europe and elsewhere) believed that in their new 
constitutions the «theory and practice of government» had finally met and 
surpassed the standards set by the anc ients, in the same way that other 
«mts» and «sciences» in generai had progressed «during the three or four 
las t centuries» (263). The «knowledge of the princ iples and construction 
of free government» had been (many believed) nearly at a standstill for 
two thousand years(264). Modern students of government confi.rmed the 
value of a «Senate» of the most «able» citizens as a «check to ministers, 
and a security against abuses» (265), they understood the necessity of an 
assembly of representati ves chosen by the people, to communicate «the 
wishes of the nation » (266), and they endorsed the benefits of balancing 
both with a strong and independent elected executive power (267). John 
Adams claimed that «the United States of America have exhibited, 
perhaps, the first example of governments erected on the simple principles 
of nature: and if men are now sufficiently enlightened to disabuse 
themselves of artifice, imposture, hypocrisy, and supersti tion, they wi ll 
consider this event as an aera in thei..r history» (268). 
For Americans «the use of reason » in securing justice and the 
common good of the people requi.red them to view legislation in the 
same light as other «Ordinary arts and sciences, only . .. of more 
importance» (269). As wise architects con su l t « Vitruvio, Pali adio, and ali 
other writers of reputati o n in the art» (270), so students of constitutional 
government put aside the « monkery of priests, or the knavery of 
poli tic ians»(271) to Iook to Cicero and Tacitus(272), pe rhaps to 
Polybius (273), bu t certainly not to the monarchi ca! despotism of 
E urope (274) or the unbalanced unicameralism of primi tive Gennany(275) 
(262) John Adams, Defence. l. 111. 
(263) !bi d. I. l. 
(264) fbid. l. I l. 
(265) fbid. l. VIli. 
(266) Jbid. l. VIII- Ix. Cf. l. x: <<There can be no free government without a democratica! 
branch in the constitution>>. 
(267) fbid. l. Xl. 
(268) fbid. f. XIII. 
(269) fbid. l. XIII-XIV. 
(270) fbid. l. XIV. 
(271) Ibid. l. xv. 
(272) Jbid. J. XVI- XIX. 
(273) lbid. l. 98; 169-176. 
(274) Ibid. l. xx. 
(275) fbid. l. XXI. 
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that had resulted in «the widespread miseries and fina! slavery of almost 
all mankind » (276). John Adams described the systems devised by 
Jegislators through the ages as «experiments» made on human life and 
manners(277). Rome and England provided the favorite models for 
modern constitution-writers (278) and Ci cero the greatest guidance, when 
be said that «the laws, which are the only possible rule, measure and 
security of justice» can be just and protected only under the checks and 
balances of a democratic republic, with two branches in the legislature, 
and an elected executive power (279). 
Americans engaged in the pseudonymous newspaper debates that 
heralded their Revolution presented themselves as 'Publius', 'Publ icola', 
'Junius', 'Brutus', 'Cato', 'Cincinnah1s', 'Tullius', 'Cicero' and the like 
because they saw their challenges as essentially the same as those that had 
threatened the justice and stability of Rome (280) : how to protect law, 
liberty, an d the balanced constitution against the t w in incursions of 
monarchy (leading to tyranny) on the one hand, and democracy (leading to 
anarchy) on the other(281). Eleven of the newly independent American 
states would adopt new constitutions between 1776 and 1780 and each 
constitution was more elaborate and carefully thought-out than the last. Of 
these, Virginia, Maryland, North Carolina, New York, South Carolina, and 
Massachusetts all had a 'Senate', and the other state legislah1res were also 
bicameral, with the exception of Pennsylvania and Georgia, which added 
senates later to bring themselves into line with the rest (282). 
When the newly independent American states finally perpetuated 
their union under a new federai Constitution in 1789, they adapted many 
of its most important attributes from the republican reforms proposed by 
Cicero for Rome. There was an elected 'Senate' , sitting on the 'Capitai' 
hill, above the 'Tiber' river (283), with a second democratic chamber to 
express the will of the people, and an elected first magistrate. The chief 
executi ve could not act, in many instances, without the «advice and 
(276) lbid. 
(277) lbid. I. xx. 
(278) lbid. l. XIX. 
(279) Jbid. l. XVII- XVIII. 
(280) See M. N. S. Sellers , American Republicanism , chapter 2: Republican 
Pseudonyms. 
(281) Adams, Defence, I. xx-xx1. 
(282) See M. N. S. Sellers, American Republicanism, chapter IO: T11e English and 
American Constitutions. 
(283) Mocked by Thomas Moore: <<Where tribunes rule, where dusky Dari bow, and 
what was Goose Creek once is Tiber now>>. The poem is d iscussed in C. J. Richard, The 
Founders and the C/assics: Greece, Rome, and the American Enlightemnent, Cambridge, 
Mass. 1994, 50. 
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consent» of the Senate (284), and the document as a whole sought to 
secure the 'Liberty' of the American people(285). George Washington, in 
assumjng bis duties as the first President of the United State, declared that 
« the preservation of the sacred fire of Iiberty, an d the destiny of the 
republican model of the government, are justly considered as deeply, 
perhaps finally, staked o n the experiment entrusted to the American 
People» (286). 
10. The French Revolution 
The French Revolution was the turning point in politica! and legaJ 
modernity, when the Ciceronian principles of law and government through 
reason f inally escaped their ancient context, to overturn the politics of 
Europe (287). Trus meant that the French Revolution was also the last great 
politica) event to take its inspiration, iconography and institutions primarily 
from classica} antiquity (288). Like the Americans, English, Italians, and 
Dutch, French revolutionaries depended on the ancient world for legai and 
politica) ideals, and the courage to apply them in practice (289). Classicism 
had been sapping the foundations of French absolutism for more than a 
century before the people of Paris finall y stormed the Basti Ile in 1789 (290). 
Camille Desmoulins, whose fiery rhetoric (according to his own account) 
precipitated the uprising of July 14, attributed the strike against despotism 
to the same sentiments that inspired patriotic reaction against Caesar at the 
end of Republican Rome(291). 
Cicero played an important role in the rhetoric and ideals of the 
French Revolution, as he had in the Uni ted States, but not without 
(284) See Constitlllion of the United States (1787) Article Il, Section 2. 
(285) lbid. Preamble. 
(286) George Washington, The First Inaugura/ Speech, in W. B. Allen (ed.), George 
Washington: A Collection, Indianapolis 1988, 462. 
(287) The Europea n Union is one symptom of this ever strengthening ideology. See e. g. 
The Constitutional Heritage of Europe (Publication of the Counci l of Europe for the 
European Comrnission for Democracy through Law), Montpellier 1997. 
(288) Harold T. Parker, The Cu/t of Allliquity and the Frenc/1 Revolwionaries: A Study 
in the Developme/11 of the Revolwionat)' Spirit, Chicago 1937. 
(289) Jacques Bouineau, Les toges due pouvoir (1789-/799), 0 11, La révolttJion de droit 
antique, Toulouse 1986. 
(290) See e. g. François-Marie Arouet ('Voltaire'), his play Brwus (1730). There are 
numerous similar examples. See Robert L. Herbert, David, Voltaire, Brwus ami the Frenc/1 
Revollllion: An Essay in Art and Politics, London 1972, Cf. L. Bertrand, La fin du 
c/assicisme et le retour à l'antique dans la seconde moitié du XVII/e siècle. Paris 1898. 
(291) Camille Desmoulins, La France fibre (1789). 
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rivals(292). Gabriel Bonnot de Mably wrote influential Observations sur 
les Romains (175 1), but also Entretiens de Phocion (1763) and 
Observations sur l 'histoire de la Grèce (1766). French attitudes towards 
antiquity idealised Cicero and the Roman republic (293), but also Sparta 
and sometimes Athens(294), dividing French revolutionary ideology into 
two main tendencies, partially antic ipated by Montesquieu and 
Rousseau (295). While the followers of Ci cero emphasized the checks an d 
balances of republican government and the rule of la w (296), adm.irers of 
Greece stressed the necessity of virtue and the importance of popular 
sovereignty (297). Neither set of views directly contradicted the other, and 
most French revolutionaries would bave found both somewhat congenial, 
but Rousseau and Mably cultivated a Spartan sensibility that could be 
somewhat at odds with Cicero's legai program of complicated checks and 
balances to contro] the assemblies and magistrates of Rome(298). 
Mably and Jacques Turgot advocated simple assemblies, like the 
British Long Parliament, which contradicted Cicero's complicated theory of 
«harmony» in government(299). The National Constituent Assembly 
embraced Cicero's politica! agenda of the rule of law (imperium legum), 
popular sovereignty (imperium populi), and natura] justice (ius naturale), 
embodied in the new French Declaration of Rights(300). But the French 
delegates would not accept a serrate as proposed by the Assembly's 
constitutional committee under Jean-Joseph Mounier and the comte de 
Mirabeau (301). The French Constitution of 1791 established a single 
(292) On Classica! lnfluences on the French Revolution, see M. N. S. Sellers, Classica! 
lnjluences in the Frenc/1 Revolution, in A. Graflon - G. Most- S. Settis (eds.), The Classica/ 
Tradition , Cambridge, Mass. 2009. 
(293) Thaddaus Zielinski, Cicero im Wandel cit., 257-272. 
(294) Harold T. Parker, The Cult of Antiquity and the French Revolutionaries: A Study 
in the Developmelll of the Revolutioncuy Spirit, Chicago 1937. 
(295) On Montesquieu, Rousseau, and the French Revolution, see Norman Hampson, 
Wi/1 and Circwnstance: Montesquieu, Rousseau, cmd the French Revolution, London 1983. 
(296) See M. N. S Sellers, The Roman Republic and the French and America/l 
Revolutions, in H. Flower (ed.), The Cambridge Compcmion to the Roman Republic, 
Cambridge 2004. Cf. Claude Nicolet, L'idée républicaine en France: (1789-1924), Paris 
1982. 
(297) See Erik Nelson, The Greek Tradition in Republican Tlwught, Cambridge 2004. 
(298) On the Spartan tradition in European thought, see Elizabeth Rawson, The Spartan 
7i·adition in European Thought, Oxford 1969, esp. 268 ff., and Harold T. Parker, The Cult of 
Allliquity and the French Revolutionaries, Chicago 1937. 
(299) John Adams' Defence of the Constitution1· of Govemment of the United Sta/es of 
America, was written primarily to respond to these criticism: see volume l. 3-8. 
(300) Michael P. Fitzsimmons, The Remaking of France: The National Assembly and 
Constitution of 1791, Cambridge 2002. 
(301) See Karen Fiorentino, La seconde clwmbre en France dans l'histoire cles 
institlllions et des idées politiques: 1789-1940, Paris 2008. 
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National Assembly and vested executive power in the King(302). This relic 
of regnum could not and did not last among a people fired with the 
recollection of Rome. [f Cicero could kill Catiline to save the republic, if 
Cincinnatus could ki ll Maelius and Brutus could ki ll Caesar, why should not 
the Convention act just as firmly to sa ve France? The death of Louis Capet 
inaugurated a lawless Terror more in keeping with the policies of Antony 
and A ugus tu s than Cicero' s visio ns of concordia and harmonia in 
Rome (303). 
Maximilien Robespiene and Louis de Saint-Just, who presided over 
the French proscriptions, both embraced the Spartan view of law and 
government. Saint-Ju st explained in describing the Esprit de la 
Révolution et de la Constitution de France (1791) that free government 
was practically impossible, once virtue had decayed (304 ). W h ere Ci cero, 
Polybius, Montesquieu and Adams studied the checks and balances 
through which 'ambition ' could be harnessed to protect the public 
good(305), the ' Jacobin' party of Saint-Just and Robespierre attempted 
to purify the people, through a strict Laconian system of education, and 
strong government action to root out any 'corruption' among the people 
or the state(306). The violence of this Jacobin ascendancy shocked 
public opinion and confinned the wisdom of neo-Roman checks and 
balances. The Cons titution of the Year III included a senate of 
'Anciens', to balance the popular assembly, and even a plural executive, 
as in Rome(307). Once again Cicero was in vogue (308). Critics mocked 
the conunissioners for speaking so incessantly about Rome (309), but 
advocates of the Constitution clearly expected their language to be 
persuasive. 
As Cicero fell before Augustus, so the French Republic succumbed 
to Napoléon Bonaparte by degrees, in a series of extra-constitutional 
manreuvers, making Bonaparte ' first consul ' in the Constitution of the 
year VIII, then 'Consul for Life' (pursuant to a senatus consulte), and 
(302) Constitlllion de 1791, Titre III. 
(303) See Ruth Scurr, Fatai Purity : Robespierre a/1(1 the French Revolwion, 
Basingstoke, 2006. Cf. Cami lle Desmoulins, Le Vieux Cordelier, numbers 3 and 4 (1793). 
(304) Louis-Antoine-Léon Saint-Just, L'esprit de la Révolution et de la Constitution de 
France, Paris 1791. 
(305) Lawrence M. Levin, The Politica/ Doctrine of Montesquieu's Esprit Des Lois: /ts 
Classica/ Background, New York 1936. 
(306) See Patrice Higonnet, Goodness beyond Virtue: Jacobùu During the Frenc/1 
Revolution, Cambridge, Mass. 1998. 
(307) On which, see Jean Bart - Françoise Naudin-Patriat (eds.), La Constitution de l'an 
III, ou, L'ordre républicain, Dijon 1998. 
(308) Baudin des Ardennes, Anecdotes et réjlexions générale sur la constitution (1795). 
(309) Louis-Philippe de Ségur, Rejléctions sur le pian de cm1stitution presentée par la 
commission des onze (1795). 
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finally in the Constitution of the Year XII, the hereditary 'emperor' of 
France. Throughout ali these changes the 'senate' and the ' tribunate' 
survived, as they had in Rome of the emperors, but without much power 
to influence affairs(310). The Revolution had run its full course, from 
Brutus to Domitian in less than fifteen ye<u·s. The lessons and partisans 
of Cicero fell before the new empire in much the same way and for 
much the same reasons that Cicero himself had failed, because he could 
not contro) the army. But the primary Iegacy of the Revolution was to 
reaff irm the principles of the rule of law and government for the 
common good, which even Napoléon purported to maintain (311). The 
question of constitutional design was now open for discussion and for 
scientific inquiry, all across the continent of Europe (312). 
The violence of the French Revolution , and its collapse into 
despotism, opened a schism in modernity between the partisans of 
Cicero, Montesquieu, and the balances of constitutional government on 
the one hand, and the partisans of Cato, Rousseau, and the direct rule of 
virtue on the other (313). Robespien e made the same mistake in France 
that the Stuarts had made in England, replacing the politica) reason of 
law in the state with his own private ' reason' , which was (as it would be 
for any individuai), excitable, self-serving and prone to rrùstakes. By 
ignoring the checks and balances proposed by Cicero, Robespiene first, 
and then Bonaparte, replaced the measured laws of constitutional 
government, with lheir own personal perceptions of justice. Almost ali 
parties now recognized truth, reason, and the common good of the 
people as the ultimate justification and source of legitimacy in the state, 
but many in positions of politica) power stili resisted the humility of 
constitutionalism, deliberation and social consensus, endorsed by Cicero 
for Rome. 
(3 10) See Catharine Edwards, ed. Ro11wn Presences : Receprions of Rome in European 
Culture, 1789-1945, Cambridge 1999, esp. V. Huet, eh. 3: Napoléon 1: a new Augustus, 
p. 53 ff. 
(311) See Napoléon-Louis Bonaparte, Des ldées Napoléoniennes (Brussels, 1839), 
t ranslated by James A . Dorr, New York 1859, 46 ff. for an interesting commentary on the 
emperor's views and illustration of the continuing resonance of the old vocabulary. 
(312) See Hadyn T. Mason- William Doyle (eds.), T/w lmpact ofthe French Revolution 
011 European Consciousness, Glouceste r 1989; Ralph C. Hancock - L. Gary Lambert (eds.), 
The Legacy of tile Frenc/1 Revolution, Lanham, Maryland 1996, esp. 189 f f.; Keith Michae1 
Baker - François Furet - Col in Lucas (eds.), The Frenclt Revolution and the Creati011 of 
Modem Politica/ Culture, Hl. The 1ì·ansformarion of Politica/ Culli/re 1789-1848, New York 
1980. 
(3 13) John Adams, Defence cit. , III. 505 criticised these <<insinuations, that a certain 
celestial virtue, more than human, has been necessary to preserve liberty», arguing that << the 
virtues bave been the effect of the well-ordered Constitution, rather than the cause>>. 
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11. The Triumph of Modernity 
Marcus Tullius Cicero differed from Tacitus and from most of his 
other literary and politica! successors not in his devotion to liberty, 
reason and balanced government, but in his persistent expectation that 
such values could prevail, despite the frailties of human nature. Cicero 
presented the science of law and government as the search for truth 
about justice, but he also recognized, and insisted upon, the imperfect, 
incomplete and fallible nature of human understanding(314). Just as in 
the field of religion Cicero condenmed the absurdities of dogmatism, in 
the face of limited knowledge(3 15), so too in law and politics he 
endorsed the search for truth and the approximation of truth, against bare 
assertions of truth or bald demands for obedience(316). Thus Cicero 
sought law in conformity with reason, despite the selfish tendency of 
human passions, and advocated a balanced (' republican') constitution, as 
the ultimate arbiter of reason in poli tics. The triumph of this attitude 
many centuries after Cicero's death marked the fina] emergence of 
modern law in Europe. 
Modernity abhors arbitrary authority and Cicero offered Europeans 
an inspiring ideai of reason as the basis for law in practice. Cicero's legacy 
stood for three principles in subsequent European law and politics, against 
emperors, prelates, and would-be princes or dictators, for two thousand 
years. F irst, true law is «recta ratio, jubens honesta e t prohibens 
contraria» ; second, law exists to serve the common and collective good of 
ali those subject to its rule; but third and decisively important in the 
e mergence of modern law and politi cs, C ice ro argued that the 
requirements of Jaw and justice emerge most clearly, through the checks 
and balances of a moderatus and permixtus form of government. Regnum 
or the unchecked authority of any single person, or of a faction of the 
people, or even of the majority of the people, was tyranny to Cicero, but 
also deeply antithetical to the principles of modern law and justice, 
because unchecked power becomes unreasonable power, without the 
guidance of other powers to contro! it. 
Machiavelli , Hobbes, and Robespierre seem 'modern ' in many 
respects, including their devotion to reason and opposition to the 
pretensions of the clergy, but their doctrines tended to perpetuate the 
premodern notion that princeps legibus solutus est. Ali three meri t 
attention, but obstructed in varying degrees the emergence of the 
(314) Cic. Acad. l, 16; 2, 66; 2, 110. 
(315) lbid. l, 15. 
(316) lbid. 2, 7 f. Cf. l, 44-46; l, 42. 
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measured constitutionalism of balanced rights and duties that distinguishes 
modern Jaw. The precocious modernity of Cicero is most evident in the 
extent to which his commitment to constitutional design surpassed his 
most perceptive successors. Modem Jawyers trying to improve the legai 
institutions of their age found Cicero more useful , not only than enemies 
of liberty, such as Thomas Hobbes, but even than such heroes of «liberty 
and the rights of mankind» as John Locke(317), John Milton (318), and 
David Hume(319). 
Reviewing Cicero's influence on European Jaw from his death unti] 
the nineteenth century reveals the history of his constant importance, from 
the moment his head and hands hung rotting in the forum. The Roman 
emperors themselves never denied Cicero's fundamental premise that law 
rests on the common good of the people, even as the memory of Cicero 
and his strictures on regnum stood as a constant rebuke to the legitimacy 
of their rule. The growing power of the clergy supplied a basis for 
challenges t o ci vii authority, providing arguments that others turned 
against the cleri es themselves. First in ltaly, then the Lo w Countries, 
England, France and ali across Europe, lawyers, scholars and politicians 
turned to Cicero to imagine a world ruled by reason, without the slavery of 
arbitrary authority. 
Successful revolutions usually begin as appeals to the past. Humans 
lack the imagination to consider, and the courage to attempt, dramatic 
innovations in law and society. Most changes happen incrementally, as 
they should, in the graduai evolution of principles and practices to the 
varying c ircumstances of the world . Cicero well understood and 
eloquently described two constant tendencies, implanted in human nature, 
that drive this evolution of the Jaw. First, the desire for justice, applied to 
every member of society. Second, the desire for self-serving power, 
present in every human bei ng. Cicero died protecting the first against the 
second, which he did with cons iderable success, despite hi s fi na! 
encounter with the servants of violence and despotism. Yet even in death 
(3 17) Whose constitutional ideas were 'a signa! absurdity' according to John Adams in 
his De.fence cit. , at l. 365. 
(318) lbid. l. 368 : «Can you read without shuddering this wild reverie of the divine 
immortal Milton?>>. 
(3 19) It would be hard to justify Hume as belonging among the heroes of liberty, but 
Hume did possess a very c lea rsighted and 'modern ' sensibility in almost ali othe r aspects of 
his thought (and a profound respect for C icero). Hume's musings about government, 
however, despite his usual perspicacity, struck John Adams as tending towards <<a 
complicated aristocracy>> that would << soon behave like ali other aristocracies», ibid. at 
L 370. Adams also had some inte resting observations on the constitutiona l proposals of Sir 
Thomas More, whose writings he valued as highly as Plato's Republic, which is to say, both 
seemed to him to be <<as wild as the ravings of Bedlam >> . lbid. at l. 365. 
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his w1itings and his memory survived. Modern lawyers would not have 
dared to challenge kings and princes, or to implement constitutional 
government in Europe, were it not for the example set by Cicero in Rome. 
The defining characteristics of modern law and government include 
the appeal to reason, the limitation of arbi trary power, and a conunitment 
to the welfare of the people as a whole. All three were present in Cicero. 
All three were rare after Caesar. Ali three remain precarious today. The 
modern age of law and politics began as lawyers, scholars, and politicians 
started to understand, to emulate, and eventually sometimes to surpass 
Cicero. 'Postmodern ' legalism begins when reason, deliberation, and 
constitutional checks and balances lose their hold on lawyers, judges, and 
others in positions of public responsibility. The eloquence, example, and 
insight of Cicero have guided the development of law in Europe for 
centuries. So long as his memory survives, the presumptions of privilege 
and tyranny will never be entirely secure. Cedant arma togae, concedat 
laurea laudi(320). 
(320) See Cic. Pilil. 2, 20. Cf. Pis. 72 f. 
